By Ninos Marcus
"The claim that the KRG represents a model of democratic coexistence cannot be sustained without confronting this record. Protection without partnership is not equality. And history, when documented honestly, does not forget"
The Kurdish uprising of 1991 was decisively crushed by Saddam Hussein’s forces. By March of that year, Iraqi armored divisions, air power, and security units had reasserted control over much of northern Iraq, inflicting heavy losses on insurgent forces and triggering mass civilian displacement. Absent external intervention, Kurdish armed factions were neither positioned nor capable of sustaining territorial control, let alone consolidating a regional political authority.
It was only with the Western-enforced no-fly zone of the 36th parallel—established after the uprising’s defeat—that Baghdad’s military advantage was neutralized. The no-fly zone prevented Iraqi air operations, disrupted centralized repression, and created a security umbrella primarily for the Kurds, while incidentally covering other populations already living north of the line, including under Assyrians and other groups, without granting them recognition, guarantees, or political protection.
Crucially, this mechanism did not constitute international authorization for secession, nor did it confer legitimacy for the creation of an ethnically defined state. It was a humanitarian protection measure, not a nation-building mandate.
As a peace-oriented nation without separatist ambitions, and despite maintaining volunteer armed forces that fought alongside Kurdish units against Saddam’s forces in 1991, Assyrians naturally sought a genuine partnership with the Kurdish people—one grounded in integrity, mutual respect, and political equality rather than unilateral dominance.
A Political Actor, Not a Client
Founded in 1979, the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) emerged as the principal political organization representing Assyrian national interests in Iraq. While acknowledging the role of other Assyrian political parties, the ADM distinguished itself through sustained political organization, participation in Iraqi opposition coalitions, and engagement with international actors.
"Crucially, the ADM framed Assyrian claims as political and administrative rather than merely cultural or religious."
Following 1991, the ADM approached the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and PUK, not as a subordinate minority body, but as a political partner within the broader Iraqi opposition. The ADM was an active participant in Iraqi opposition frameworks and articulated a platform grounded in pluralism, decentralization, and the right of peoples to self-determination within Iraq. Crucially, the ADM framed Assyrian claims as political and administrative rather than merely cultural or religious. It emphasized local governance, administrative authority in Assyrian-inhabited areas, and security guarantees for returning civilians—positions consistent with international minority-rights standards articulated by the United Nations.
An Anticipated Plural Northern Iraq
In the immediate aftermath of the no-fly zone, Assyrian political actors envisioned a plural northern Iraq composed of multiple components—Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen, and others—each administering their own lands while coexisting within a shared regional framework. This vision did not imply demographic parity with Kurdish parties or shared sovereignty over all of northern Iraq. Rather, it reflected an expectation that governance would be negotiated and inclusive, not monopolized by one national group.
ADM behavior supports this interpretation. The movement organized politically, contested elections, issued governance-oriented programs, and engaged Kurdish authorities as counterparts—actions characteristic of a political actor anticipating agency rather than subordination.
The Reality: National Consolidation Over Pluralism
The political order that emerged after 1991 diverged sharply from this pluralistic vision. Rather than developing into an inclusive post-Ba’ath framework reflecting the region's ethnic and historical diversity, governance in northern Iraq consolidated around a single national project.
The post-1991 administration adopted the nomenclature of “Kurdistan", a political framing that emphasized Kurdish national claims while sidelining the region’s multi-ethnic and indigenous character, particularly the Assyrian presence. This framing was not merely symbolic. It shaped institutional structures, territorial narratives, and political legitimacy, positioning Kurds as the constituent nation while recasting Assyrians and other indigenous communities as minorities within their own ancestral lands.
Human Rights Watch observed that political authority in the region became concentrated in the hands of dominant Kurdish parties, with limited institutional safeguards to ensure meaningful participation or protection for minoritized communities.
Marginalization, Cultural Reduction, and Historical Reframing
As Kurdish authority consolidated under the protection of the no-fly zone, the ADM was progressively marginalized. Political participation was reduced to token representation without meaningful influence over decision-making. Assyrian lands were subjected to appropriation and settlement by Kurds, and property disputes overwhelmingly favored Kurdish claimants—a pattern documented in detail by Human Rights Watch, which found that minority communities lacked access to impartial legal remedies and were often disadvantaged by party-controlled local authorities.
Even where cultural and religious rights were nominally recognized, they were tightly circumscribed. Assyrian educational curricula came under oversight, and Assyrian children were required to learn state-approved narratives that elevated Kurdish historical figures historically associated with mass violence against Assyrians—without critical contextualization.
Meanwhile, serious crimes against Assyrians—including killings and intimidation—frequently were uninvestigated or unprosecuted, reinforcing perceptions of institutional impunity.
What True Partnership Would Have Required
The post-1991 period offered a historic opportunity to reset Assyrian-Kurdish relations. Despite a long and painful history—including Kurdish participation in mass violence against Assyrians between 1843-1915, a new chapter could have been written. A genuine partnership would have required allowing Assyrians in northern Iraq to administer their own lands; prosecuting transgressions against Assyrians fairly and transparently; ensuring equitable political representation in regional institutions; refraining from interference designed to sabotage Assyrian political movements; and supporting Assyrian aspirations for an administrative region in the Nineveh Plains, consistent with Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution, rather than undermining them.
None of these conditions have been met. The result has been the erosion of trust, the hollowing out of Assyrian political life, and the continued displacement and migration of an indigenous people from its historic homeland.
The claim that the KRG represents a model of democratic coexistence cannot be sustained without confronting this record. Protection without partnership is not equality. And history, when documented honestly, does not forget.
